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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is one of the most prominent technologies to
host Internet services that unfortunately leads to an increased
risk of data the. Customers of cloud services have to trust the
cloud providers, as they control the building blocks that form the
cloud. is includes the hypervisor enabling the sharing of a sin-
gle hardware platform among multiple tenants. Executing in a
higher-privileged CPU mode, the hypervisor has direct access to
the memory of virtual machines. While data at rest can be pro-
tected using well-known disk encryption methods, data residing in
main memory is still threatened by a potentially malicious cloud
provider.
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) claims a new level
of protection in such cloud scenarios. AMD SEV encrypts the main
memory of virtual machines with VM-specic keys, thereby deny-
ing the higher-privileged hypervisor access to a guest’s memory.
To enable the cloud customer to verify the correct deployment of
his virtual machine, SEV additionally introduces a remote aes-
tation protocol. is protocol is a crucial component of the SEV
technology that can prove that SEV protection is in place and that
the virtual machine was not subject to manipulation.
is paper analyzes the rmware components that implement
the SEV remote aestation protocol on the current AMD Epyc
Naples CPU series. We demonstrate that it is possible to extract
critical CPU-specic keys that are fundamental for the security of
the remote aestation protocol.
Building on the extracted keys, we propose aacks that allow
a malicious cloud provider a complete circumvention of the SEV
protection mechanisms. Although the underlying rmware issues
were already xed by AMD, we show that the current series of
AMD Epyc CPUs, i.e., the Naples series, does not prevent the in-
stallation of previous rmware versions. We show that the severity
of our proposed aacks is very high as no purely soware-based
mitigations are possible. is eectively renders the SEV technol-
ogy on current AMD Epyc CPUs useless when confronted with an
untrusted cloud provider.
To overcome these issues, we also propose robust changes to the
SEV design that allow future generations of the SEV technology to
mitigate the proposed aacks.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is one of the core foundations of today’s Internet
landscape. e manifold advantages such as on-demand resource
allocation or high availability of services have lead to a wide usage
of this technology. However, outsourcing the processing of enter-
prise data comes at a risk. e technical infrastructure that forms
the cloud is owned by the cloud provider and thus under his full
control. is includes the server hardware, as well as the soware
components that allow the co-location of multiple virtual machines
on a single host.
erefore security concerns impede the deployment of conden-
tial data and applications in cloud scenarios [14, 19]. e potential
threats range from misconguration of soware components over
cloud provider admin access to foreign government access [8].
To counter these threats, the research community, as well as in-
dustry, proposed new approaches to allow secure cloud computing
when confronted with an untrusted cloud provider [18, 23, 29, 33,
34, 36]. Most prominent is the recently released Secure Encrypted
Virtualization technology by AMD [6]. SEV’s goals are twofold:
(a) Prove the correct deployment of virtual machines.
(b) Oer virtual machine protection at runtime.
To achieve (a), a dedicated co-processor, the Platform Security
Processor (PSP), creates a cryptographic hash of the components
that form the initial virtual machine state, similar to the remote
aestation feature of a TPM.
“With this aestation, a guest owner can ensure
that the hypervisor did not interfere with the ini-
tialization of SEV before transmiing condential
information to the guest.” [6]
(b) is achieved by using memory encryption with virtual machine-
specic encryption keys. ese keys are generated upon creation
of a virtual machine and are stored inside the PSP that uses its
own private memory. is memory is not accessible from the main
processor, which is executing soware components controlled by
the cloud provider such as the hypervisor. A hardware memory
encryption unit provides transparent encryption and decryption
using the virtual machine-specic key when the respective virtual
machine is scheduled.
“Even though the hypervisor level is tradition-
ally ’more privileged’ than the guest level, SEV
separates these levels through cryptographic iso-
lation.” [6]
Furthermore, to allow the authentication of an SEV platform,
each SEV-enabled platform contains a key pair that is unique to this
platform. e public key is signed by AMD and, given a platform-
specic ID, a guest owner can obtain this key from an AMD key
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server. is key is the basis for a remote aestation protocol that
enables the user to verify the correct deployment of her VM, in-
cluding that SEV protection is in place. Only then she will inject a
guest secret, e.g., a disk encryption key, into the guest VM using a
secure channel between the PSP and the guest owner. is remote
aestation feature is a key component when using the infrastruc-
ture of an untrusted cloud provider. It provides cryptographic proof
that the cloud provider uses an authentic AMD platform with SEV
enabled and deployed the virtual machine according to the owner’s
conguration.
Previous research focused on the security of SEV-protected vir-
tual machines at runtime [11, 15, 25] while the remote aestation
feature of SEV has not been subject to a comprehensive analysis
yet. To overcome this gap, we analyzed the rmware components
that implement the remote aestation feature1. We demonstrate
that it is possible to extract the platform-specic private key, upon
which the security of the remote aestation protocol depends. is
enables the untrusted cloud provider to violate the security goals
of the SEV technology. Specically, it enables the cloud provider to
forge the presence of SEV altogether, intercept the communication
between guest owner and SEV rmware and decrypt guest memory.
We show that it is, to the best of our knowledge, impossible to
provide a purely soware-based x for these issues. is questions
the security capabilities of the SEV feature for the complete AMD
Epyc Naples processor line. More so, it actively puts SEV customers’
data at risk since SEV might aract condential data that was
previously not hosted in the cloud.
Furthermore, we propose a new design for the remote aestation
protocol. While the current SEV design cannot cope with rmware
security issues, the proposed design allows to revert to a trusted
state in case of previous rmware issues. Our proposed design
enables SEV customers to trust the remote platform even in case
the platform-specic private key was leaked.
Our contributions are:
(1) We conduct a comprehensive security analysis of the rmware
components that implement SEV’s remote aestation pro-
tocol. Our analysis reveals issues that allow to extract
private keys that are fundamental to the security of the
SEV technology. More so, the current AMD Epyc CPUs
allow to install arbitrary signed rmware versions, hence
extraction is possible even on systems that use patched
rmware versions.
(2) We propose aacks based on our ndings that allow to
fake the presence of SEV or extract encrypted VM memory
in plaintext.
(3) We show a severe design issue of the protocol, rendering
it useless in case of common rmware issues. e severity
is amplied as the issue allows to mount aacks targeting
platforms with no security issues present: Possession of an
extracted key is sucient to mount the aacks, regardless of
whether the key belongs to the aacked platform or not.
1To facilitate further research we published a PSP rmware analysis tool. e tool can
be found at [32].
(4) Lastly, we propose robust design changes to the SEV tech-
nology that allow future generations of SEV to mitigate
the impact of rmware security issues.
Ethical considerations: We informed AMD of the rmware is-
sues found during our analysis. AMD conrmed the presence of
the rmware issues and published security updates to the PSP
rmware. Similar issues had been previously reported by other
security researchers [21]. Furthermore, we reported the extracted
keys to AMD to allow a revocation of the corresponding certicates.
Although security xes are already provided by AMD, our ndings
show that soware-based mitigations are not sucient.
We therefore refrain from publishing any specic
details on the rmware issues at this point in time.
To prove the successful extraction of private keys,
we provide a signature of the paper title created
with the extracted keys at [9]. e signature can
be veried using certicates provided by AMD.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we
give an overview of the SEV technology, its remote aestation capa-
bilities and the PSP. Section 3 presents the results of our rmware
analysis necessary to understand the aacks. e aacks are moti-
vated in Section 4 and described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
the implications on the security of SEV and proposes a new design
for the remote aestation functionality. In Section 7 we give an
overview of related work and nally conclude in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give an overview of basic x86 virtualization
concepts and more specically on the Secure Encrypted Virtualiza-
tion technology by AMD including the Platform Security Processor
(PSP). We focus on the remote aestation feature as this is our main
subject of analysis for the rest of the paper.
2.1 x86 Virtualization Concepts
Hardware extensions to facilitate the use of virtual machines were
introduced in 2005 by both Intel (VT-x) [30] and AMD (SVM) [1].
ese extensions distinguish between the higher-privileged host
mode and the lower-privileged guest mode. Both modes are com-
prised of dierent privilege rings, which allow separating each
mode in privileged and unprivileged execution compartments. e
host mode controls the resources, such as memory and CPU time,
of the guest mode.
A soware component called hypervisor executes in the host
mode, whereas the guest mode is occupied by the guest virtual
machines (VMs). In a cloud scenario, the hypervisor is supplied
by the cloud provider and therefore under full control of the cloud
provider.
Running in the higher privileged host mode, the hypervisor has
full access to the guest VM’s memory content.
2.2 Secure Encrypted Virtualization
e Secure Encrypted Virtualization technology (SEV) was rst pre-
sented by AMD in 2016 [6]. It aims to protect a machine in the
presence of an untrusted cloud provider. e primary responsi-
bilities of SEV are runtime protection and secure initialization of
virtual machines.
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roughout the rest of the document, the term platform owner
refers to any entity that owns the SEV platform, i.e., the AMD
system that hosts the virtual machines. e term guest owner refers
to any entity that intends to utilize the platform provided by the
platform owner. In a typical use case, the platform owner is the
cloud computing provider, and the guest owner is a customer of
the provider.
e term SEV rmware refers to the code running on the SEV
platform implementing the SEV API [5]. It is provided by AMD
and hosted by the Platform Security Processor (PSP), in contrast to
the main x86 cores (referred to as main processor in this document),
that are under full control of the platform owner.
Runtime Protection e core of SEV’s runtime protection is a
memory encryption engine embedded in the memory controller
that encrypts the main memory using AES-128 [6]2. e encryp-
tion keys are generated by a rmware running on a dedicated
processor called the Platform Security Processor (PSP). It provides
an API [3] that the hypervisor, running on the main processor, must
use in order to manage the encryption keys for SEV-enabled guests.
An SEV-enabled guest controls which memory pages are passed
through the encryption engine by its guest pagetable.
Remote Aestation Even with runtime protection in place, SEV
would be useless in the face of an untrusted cloud provider, if the
platform owner could modify the VM during deployment or fake
the presence of SEV altogether. rough remote aestation, the
SEV rmware implicitly provides proof of authenticity of the SEV
platform to the guest owner and explicitly aests a VM’s integrity
to her. is is explained in Section 2.4 and 2.5.
Platform Security Processor Introduced in 2013 [2], the Plat-
form Security Processor (PSP) is a dedicated ARMv7 based co-
processor built into the die of AMD CPUs providing security func-
tionality. It uses its own memory and non-volatile storage and can
access the main processor’s system memory. e rmware running
on the PSP is provided by AMD and integrity protected.
It also hosts a dedicated SEV rmware [5] that implements the
SEV API specied in [3].
2.3 SEV: Cryptographic Keys
SEV oers cryptographic proof that a) the remote platform is an
authentic AMD platform which supports SEV and b) that a guest
was deployed with SEV protection in place. To that end, the SEV
rmware manages several cryptographic keys that are explained
in this section.
Firmware Identity Upon initialization, the SEV rmware run-
ning on the PSP generates an ECDSA key, the Platform Endorsement
Key (PEK), using a secure entropy source, see Figure 1. e SEV
rmware uses the PEK to sign the Platform Die-Hellman key
(PDH), which is used to negotiate a shared secret with a remote
party, e.g., to establish the secure channel between the guest owner
2To protect the guest register state, AMD proposed an extension to SEV: SEV-Encrypted
State (SEV-ES) [20].
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Figure 1: Cryptographic keys in SEV. A shield denotes the
key as the root of trust for the corresponding certicate
chain. Boxes show the scope of the respective keys.
and the SEV platform[3, Chapter 1.2.2].
Platform Ownership Ownership information is provided by
signing the PEK with a certicate authority (CA) of the cloud
provider, the owner certicate authority (OCA), see Figure 1. e
SEV rmware allows generating a certicate signing request (CSR)
of the PEK. is allows the cloud provider to sign the PEK. e
signed PEK certicate is then re-imported into the SEV rmware [3,
Chapter 1.2.4].
Platform Authenticity To provide the guest owner with an au-
thenticity guarantee of the platform, the PEK is also signed by the
Chip Endorsement Key (CEK), see Figure 1. e CEK is an ECDSA
key which is derived from CPU-specic secrets stored in one-time-
programmable fuses (OTP fuse) in the CPU [3, Chapter 1.2.3]. To
prove the authenticity of the CEK, it is signed by the AMD SEV
Signing Key (ASK) which is in turn signed by the AMD Root Key
(ARK). As the CEK is unique for each platform, the SEV API spec-
ies a command to retrieve a unique identier tied to a platform.
While the CEK private key must remain condential, the signed
certicates of the CEK, ASK and the ARK can be obtained from
AMD [4] using the platform ID provided by the SEV rmware. e
CEK, therefore, plays a central role in the trust model of SEV.
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Condential Communication Since SEV assumes an untrusted
hypervisor, condential communication must be ensured for two
cases: First, during the initial deployment of a VM, between the
guest owner and the SEV rmware of the target platform. Second,
during migration, between the SEV rmwares of the source and
target platform.
To this end, a client and the SEV rmware use the Die-Hellman
protocol to establish a shared secret, the master secret. A client in
this context is either a guest owner or another SEV rmware in
case of migration. Using a key derivation function (KDF) and the
established master secret, both the client and the SEV rmware de-
rive the Key Encryption Key (KEK) and the Key Integrity Key (KIK).
ese keys are used to protect the transport keys, the so-called
Transport Encryption Key (TEK) and Transport Integrity Key (TIK).
e transport keys are encrypted using the KEK, and a MAC is gen-
erated using the KIK. is process is referred to as key wrapping [3,
Chapter 2.1]. Note that the transport keys are chosen by the client,
whereas KIK and KEK are derived from the master secret.
e transport keys are then used to ensure the integrity and
condentiality of data exchanged between the SEV rmware and
outside entities. e following section explains the protocol used
to establish the secure channel.
2.4 SEV: Establish Secure Channel
In order to establish the secure channel, both client and SEV rmware
follow the steps depicted in Figure 2. As the SEV API is only ac-
cessible via the hypervisor, the secure channel must guarantee
authenticity, integrity, and condentiality of the communication.
In case of deployment, the client is the guest owner, see variant D.
In case of migration, the client is the source platform and the SEV
rmware is the target platform of the migration, variant M.
In the rst step, the hypervisor retrieves the PDH and the PEK
certicate together with a unique platform ID of the target platform.
Using this ID, either the hypervisor, in case of migration, or the
guest owner, during deployment, consult the AMD key server to
obtain the CEKID certicate along with the ARK and ASK. e
client is now able to authenticate the target platform by verifying
the certicate chain3 as shown in Step 5. In that case, the client
would also verify that the PEK is signed by the OCA in Step 5). In
Step 6 the authenticated PDH is then used to negotiate the master
secret using a Die-Hellman key exchange [3, Chapter 2.2.2]. e
master secret is only known by the client and the target, but not by
the hypervisor. Using the master secret the key encryption keys are
derived, see Section 2.3. Finally, the client generates the transport
encryption keys and wraps them using KIK and KEK, Step 7. e
wrapped keys and the Die-Hellman share are then transferred to
the target.
Both client and the target SEV rmware now hold the transport
keys that allow authenticated, encrypted, and integrity protected
communication.
3To allow the client to verify the ownership of the platform, the PEK can also be signed
with the OCA.
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Figure 2: SEV Secure Channel. Protocol initiated by the
guest owner, in case of deployment (D) and the hypervisor,
in case of migration (M).
2.5 SEV: Guest Deployment
While Section 2.4 explained the establishment of the secure channel,
this section gives an overview of the steps required to deploy a
guest VM in an SEV-enabled cloud system.
Prior to the guest deployment, the platform owner has to ini-
tialize the SEV platform. During initialization, the SEV rmware
derives the platform-specic keys described in Section 2.3. Further-
more, the rmware establishes a chain of trust by signing the PDH
with the PEK and the PEK with the CEK:
PDH → PEK → CEK → ASK → ARK (1)
is is also depicted in Figure 1. Optionally, a second certicate
chain is established:
PDH → PEK → OCA (2)
ese chains allow a client to authenticate a given PDH4. Aer
these steps, the SEV rmware transitions into the initialized state.
Before any guest VM can be deployed on the platform, the guest
owner authenticates the remote SEV platform. Using the steps
shown in Figure 2, she can establish a secure channel with the
remote SEV platform. e verication of the certicate chain, see
Step 5, ensures that the remote system is an authentic AMD system
4In case the platform was already initialized, the encrypted and integrity protected
state is read from non-volatile storage.
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that supports SEV.
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Figure 3: Initial deployment of a guest virtual machine in
an SEV scenario.
Launching the Guest e guest owner now prepares the guest
VM to be executed by the cloud provider. e initial guest VM is sent
to the hypervisor unencrypted and therefore must not contain any
condential data. To ensure the condentiality of the guest owner’s
data, the initial guest image will usually contain an additional
encrypted disk image. In this case, the encryption key is then
later provided using the established secure channel. Besides the
VM image itself, the guest owner must also provide a policy that
denes restrictions on the actions the cloud provider can perform
on the guest VM. ese include, e.g., the cloud provider’s ability
to migrate the guest VM to another platform or the minimum SEV
API version that the target SEV rmware must implement. As the
memory encryption of SEV prevents traditional VM migration, the
SEV rmware provides an interface to migrate VMs to a dierent
host, as outlined in the following section.
e guest owner deploys the VM, including the encrypted disk
image, to the cloud provider, see Step 1 of Figure 3. e hypervi-
sor launches the guest and calls the SEV rmware to encrypt the
memory, Step 2. Next, the SEV rmware calculates a hash of the
initial plaintext VM memory. e hash, together with the SEV API
version and the guest policy, is protected by the secure channel and
transferred to the guest owner, see Step 3 and 4. e hash gives
the guest owner condence that the VM was deployed unmodied
by the hypervisor. Lastly, in Steps 5 and 6, the guest owner uses
the secure channel to provide the disk encryption key to the VM.
is allows the VM to decrypt the disk and process the condential
data. e guest VM is now fully operational and protected by SEV.
2.6 SEV: Migration and Snapshots
Virtual machine migration and snapshoing are common tasks in
a cloud computing environment. Both migration and snapshoing
require the export of virtual machine memory. In case of migration,
the memory is then exported to a dierent platform, while for
snapshoing, the memory is saved on the same platform for a later
re-import.
As SEV encrypts virtual machine memory using ephemeral keys
which never leave the SEV rmware, SEV provides a special mech-
anism to export memory. Additionally, the guest owner can impose
restrictions on the memory export. She can prohibit the export
using the guest policy, and she can dene the minimum SEV API
version of the target system using the API elds of the guest pol-
icy [3, Chapter 3].
Using the SEV API, the hypervisor initiates the export of the VM
memory on the source platform. e exported memory is encrypted,
and integrity protected using transport keys that are generated by
the source SEV rmware. To that end a secure channel between
the source and the target SEV rmware is established, see Figure 2
variant M. e target platform can decrypt the exported memory
and re-encrypt it using a freshly generated ephemeral memory
encryption key. is allows the export of encrypted memory in the
face of an untrusted hypervisor as only the source and the target
SEV rmware share the transport keys that are used to encrypt the
exported memory.
3 FIRMWARE ANALYSIS
e Platform Security Processor (PSP) hosts a rmware provided
by AMD. Amongst other things, this rmware implements all SEV
related operations carried out by the PSP. Given the trust model of
SEV where the guest owner requests services from an untrusted
hypervisor, it is paramount that this rmware is not under control
of the platform owner, but instead provisioned by a trusted entity,
AMD in this case. is section presents the results of our rmware
analysis on which our aacks in Section 5 are based.
3.1 PSP Firmware Structure
By analyzing UEFI rmware updates of AMD Epyc systems, we
were able to locate the PSP rmware. It is comprised of several
components which are stored in an undocumented area of the UEFI
rmware image. Although the layout of the UEFI rmware residing
on the SPI ash is standardized [12], the PSP and SEV rmware are
not part of the standardized layout. Building on published informa-
tion from the Coreboot project [26] and the SEV API specication
[3] we were able to understand the proprietary lesystem and iden-
tify and extract all rmware components. e individual rmware
components are prepended with a header containing metadata. is
metadata contains a version eld and also determines the certicate
used to verify the component’s integrity.
Most relevant for the aacks presented in this work are three
components: e ARK public key (see Figure 1), a component we
call PSP Operating System (PSP OS) and a component that imple-
ments the SEV API, the SEV rmware. To facilitate further research,
we developed a PSP rmware analysis tool which is published
under [32].
PSPTool allows to parse the proprietary lesystem used to store
the PSP OS and SEV rmware. It lists all rmware components
alongside various aributes. Furthermore, it is able to correlate SPI
read accesses recorded with a logic analyzer with a given binary.
is allows to inspect the order in which the PSP rmware com-
ponents are loaded from ash. A full list of features can be found
at [32].
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ARK Public Key is ARK is a 2048 bit RSA public key stored
in a format as described in [3, Appendix B.1]. We could verify that
both the PSP OS and the SEV rmware are signed with the ARK
private key. e prepended header of each component is part of
the signed data. e ARK public key is also contained in the ARK
certicate that can be obtained from the AMD key server [4], see
Section 2.3.
PSP Operating System e PSP OS is the only component that
contains privileged ARM code. It executes in the privileged mode
of the PSP, the SVC mode, with paging enabled. Amongst its respon-
sibilities are system initialization and loading of other rmware
components. ese components execute in the unprivileged USR
mode and are thus separated from the PSP OS. ere is always only
a single unprivileged component present in memory. To switch to
a dierent component, the currently loaded component is replaced.
e PSP OS provides a syscall interface for unprivileged compo-
nents that provides, e.g., access to the cryptographic co-processor
(CCP). e CCP is a dedicated hardware component that allows
ooading various cryptographic operations. It is usable from both
the main processor and the PSP.
SEV Firmware e SEV rmware implements the SEV API spec-
ication [3]. It is loaded by the PSP OS and is executed in the
unprivileged USR mode. Its responsibilities include the key genera-
tion steps shown in Section 2.3 as well as the policy enforcement
described in Step 4 of Section 2.5. It maintains a state of all SEV-
enabled guest VMs as well as the platform state which includes the
generated certicates and private keys. Upon initialization, the SEV
rmware will either load a previously saved state from non-volatile
storage utilizing the syscall interface provided by the PSP OS or
generate a new state including new certicates. e saved state
is encrypted, and integrity protected [3, Chapter 5.1.5]. e guest
state includes the guest policy as well as the guest VM’s memory
encryption keys. While the PEK and PDH are generated using a
“secure entropy source” [3, 2.1.1f)], the CEK is derived from “chip-
unique OTP fuses” and has a lifetime of the corresponding CPU [3,
2.1.3]. To retrieve the value from the OTP fuse, the SEV rmware
issues a syscall. e PSP OS will then retrieve 32 bytes from the
CCP and relay it to the SEV rmware. ese 32 bytes are used as
an input to a key derivation function.
3.2 PSP Boot Security
To beer understand the PSP boot process, we used a logic analyzer
to record accesses to the SPI ash memory hosting the UEFI im-
age. e PSP rmware components are stored alongside the UEFI
rmware. Specically, the PSP rmware resides in UEFI padding
volumes (Pad File), see [12, Chapter 2.1.4]. We observed that the
rst components that are loaded from ash are the ARK public key
and the PSP OS. We also observed a delay aer the PSP OS is loaded
and before any other aempt to access the ash can be observed.
Our experiments have shown that a modied ARK will result in no
further ash reads aer the ARK is read. In case the PSP OS was
altered, a PSP OS from a dierent ash location is loaded. If this
recovery PSP OS is also altered, the system resets.
PSP ROM
On-Chip Bootloader
3. Load & verify PSP OS
1. Store fuse value in CCP
2. Load & verify ARK
One-Time-
Programmable Fuse
UEFI Volume
PSP OS
ARK Public Key4. Initialize PSP
5. Load & verify SEV Firmware
SEV Firmware
6. Derive cryptographic keys
Figure 4: Boot procedure on an SEV-enabled system. A lock
denotes a non-modiable componentwhereas a pen denotes
modiable components. Arrows denote dependencies of ini-
tialization steps.
Based on these observations and our static analysis from Section
3, we inferred a boot order, as shown in Figure 4. e Figure focuses
on the security-relevant parts of the SEV technology; other steps
of the boot process are omied.
In addition to the PSP OS and the SEV rmware, a third compo-
nent is responsible for bootstrapping the system. is component
is responsible for loading the ARK certicate and the PSP OS from
ash, steps 2 & 3. Since it is not part of the PSP rmware loaded
from ash and we conclude that it is stored in a read-only memory
(ROM) of the PSP, we call it on-chip bootloader.
Our static analysis revealed that the OTP value that is used to
derive the CEK, see Section 2.3, is provided by the PSP OS via a
syscall. e implementation of that syscall simply forwards a value
from the CCP to the calling unprivileged component. is value is
stored in a storage block of the CCP. ese storage blocks are used by
the CCP to maintain a context for cryptographic routines [22]. From
that, we conclude that the on-chip bootloader is also responsible
for storing the OTP value in the CCP storage block, see Step 1 of
Figure 4.
Aer the integrity of the PSP OS is veried, the PSP OS is exe-
cuted. It initializes the PSP, Step 4, which includes basic operating
systems tasks such as initializing the pagetables and peripherals,
e.g., the interrupt controller. In Step 5, it loads the SEV rmware
and veries its integrity using the ARK public key. e ARK public
key is not loaded from ash again, but instead, the PSP OS assumes
the presence of that key at a xed memory location. We infer that
the PSP on-chip bootloader placed the ARK public key there aer
its integrity was veried in Step 2. Lastly, upon initialization of the
SEV rmware, the rmware either loads the platform state from
non-volatile storage, see Section 2.2, or generates the cryptographic
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keys, Step 6, as described in Section 2.5.
Security Issues Our experiments revealed a security issue in the
signature verication mechanism of the PSP OS which allowed us to
load custom components through modied UEFI images. Either the
aacker has physical access to the SPI ash chip and makes use of an
SPI programmer, or the UEFI update mechanism of the motherboard
vendor allows her to ash a custom image. Depending on the
vendor, there is no signature check on the UEFI image in place [28]
or it can be disabled [10]. ese tools can be used remotely, so no
physical access to the target device is required. Similar issues were
previously published by security researchers [13]. AMD conrmed
the existence of these issues [24] and newer versions of the PSP
OS are already patched. However, our experiments showed that
the PSP does not employ any rollback prevention mechanism, i.e.,
even though a system already makes use of a patched PSP OS, it
is always possible to revert to an earlier, vulnerable version. us,
as the issues exist in signed versions of the PSP OS, mitigations
require changes to the component verifying the signature, the on-
chip bootloader, in order to prevent a vulnerable PSP OS version
from being loaded.
AMD conrmed to us in personal correspondence that the on-
chip bootloader is not updatable through a rmware update. Instead,
using the UEFI update mechanism, the PSP is able to update a
fuse conguration that allows changing the key that is used to
authenticate the PSP rmware components. is could be leveraged
to revoke the currently used key and thus prevent the vulnerable
PSP OS version to be loaded. In this case, updated versions of the
PSP OS would have to be signed with an alternative key.
But even though multiple issues of the PSP OS have been reported
to AMD in mid 2018 [13], we have not found any evidence of a
key revocation. To that end, we analyzed ten dierent binaries
from ve dierent motherboard vendors. At the time of writing,
the latest UEFI updates contain PSP OS versions that are signed
with the same key as the vulnerable PSP OS version. From that,
we conclude that AMD has not revoked any ARK public keys in
order to suspend vulnerable PSP rmware versions. To the best of
our knowledge, the same ARK is used across all CPUs of the AMD
Epyc Naples series. is indicates that every CPU of that series is
aected as any PSP OS version is loaded as long as it is signed with
the ARK. Based on these results we conclude that for the AMD
Epyc Naples series CPUs, an aacker is able to:
(1) Execute custom code on the PSP using a vulnerability
in the signature verication mechanism of the PSP OS.
(2) Roll back from any PSP OS version to a vulnerable PSP
OS version.
3.3 CEK Extraction
Leveraging the security issues discussed in the previous section, we
built and deployed a patched SEV rmware. is rmware allows
us to read and write arbitrary PSP memory. Using this patched SEV
rmware, we extracted the SEV state, see Section 3.1, including the
CEK private key of three dierent AMD Epyc CPUs.
We obtained the corresponding signed CEK certicates from
the AMD key server, see Section 2.3, and veried the extracted
private keys by creating signatures that can be validated using the
signed CEK certicate. A proof-of-concept signature created with
an extracted CEK can be found at [9].
Although the exact details of the CEK extraction are omied
in this paper, we will provide security researchers with additional
details to reproduce our results upon request. We plan to release
the exact details once a xed hardware platform is available for
customers.
As both the authenticity of the SEV platform as well as the
condentiality of the data protected by SEV rely on the security of
the CEK, the CEK extraction lays the groundwork for the rst two
aacks in Section 5. e motivation for our aacks is discussed in
the following section.
4 ATTACK MOTIVATION
e SEV technology oers data protection of virtual machines in the
face of an untrusted platform owner. is incorporates a malicious
cloud provider or a malicious system administrator. In this section,
we present two dierent motivations for an aacker to circumvent
the security properties of SEV as presented in Section 2 and Section
3.
4.1 Extract Condential Data
e rst motivation regards data the and originates from an indi-
vidual targeting an SEV guest owner.
e additional security measures provided by SEV enable compa-
nies to process condential data in the cloud, that would otherwise
not be processed in the cloud because of its condentiality. e
goal of the rst type of aacker is to get access to this data despite
the presence of SEV.
An individual with malicious intent and sucient permissions
could use data from a commercial guest owner to pursue traditional
fraud, e.g., with stolen credit card data.
4.2 Save Resource Overhead
e second motivation is of economic nature and originates on the
organizational level of a cloud provider.
In an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) scenario, the cloud provider
charges guest owners based on the amount of resources they allo-
cate, including CPU, memory, and disk utilization.
In order to increase the overall utilization of memory, many
hypervisors employKernel same-pagemerging (KSM) [7] to increase
the memory utilization.
KSM requires the hypervisor to read the guest memory of vir-
tual machines in plaintext to identify duplicate pages. Using SEV
prohibits KSM, since memory pages of dierent guest VMs are en-
crypted using dierent keys. erefore, the memory requirement
of an SEV-enabled system is increased, which results in higher
costs for the cloud provider. In an IaaS scenario, it is likely that
the cloud provider will pass those additional costs to the customers
commissioning the security features of SEV.
While a benevolent cloud provider might disable KSM to prevent
aacks such as [35], and [27], this is not necessarily the case for a
provider with malicious intent.
In order to increase revenue, a malicious cloud provider could
fake the presence of SEV, while still charging additionally for SEV
protection. e guest VM would instead be hosted traditionally
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on a non SEV-enabled system, leveraging, e.g., KSM to reduce
the memory consumption and therefore the costs for the cloud
provider.
5 ATTACKS
In this section, we propose three dierent aacks targeting AMD
SEV. ese are structured according to the two main aack motiva-
tions, as described in Section 4.
5.1 Fake SEV
As presented in Section 4.2, SEV prevents the use of virtualization
features like KSM, thus increasing the overall memory requirements
of a cloud setup. is additional cost may motivate a malicious
cloud provider to fake the presence of SEV. Furthermore, by faking
the presence of SEV, the cloud provider gains access to data which
is not accessible when protected by SEV. Using an extracted CEK
private key as shown in Section 3.3, the cloud provider may pose as
an authentic AMD SEV platform even though SEV is not enabled
or even present at all.
Aack model e aacker is a cloud provider running arbitrary
hosting hardware, who has had access to any SEV-enabled sys-
tem for one-time extraction of the CEK private key and the corre-
sponding platform ID. It is not required that this specic system
hosts the victim’s VM. e victim is a cloud customer expecting
an SEV-enabled VM from the aacker. is aack does not impose
restrictions on the guest system in use.
Method From the point of view of a guest owner, the correct
deployment of VMs can be veried through remote aestation by
the trusted SEV rmware. As described in Step 5 of Figure 2, the
guest owner authenticates the remote platform using a certicate
chain (as seen in Figure 1) that roots in the AMD Root Signing
Key (ARK). Once the remote platform is authenticated, the guest
owner denes the transport keys, wraps them, and sends them to
the cloud provider, see Steps 7 and 8 of Figure 2.
In order to simulate the presence of SEV, the aacker rst gen-
erates an arbitrary PEK and, if required, signs it using the OCA.
Next, she uses the extracted CEK private key (see Section 3.3) to
sign the PEK. She then generates a PDH which is in turn signed by
the PEK. Now, the aacker has control over the highlighted parts
of the certicate chains:
PDH → PEK → CEK → ASK → ARK (3)
PDH → PEK → OCA (4)
To mount the aack, the aacker provides the platform ID corre-
sponding to the CEK, the PEK, and PDH to the guest owner. e
guest owner will obtain the ASK, ARK, and CEK certicates from
the AMD key server, see Steps 3 and 4, variant D of Figure 2. Aer
verication of the certicate chains, the guest owner deploys the
guest VM, including the encrypted transport keys. As the aacker
possesses the private PDH key, she can decrypt the transport keys
provided by the guest owner. Now the aacker calculates a hash
of the guest VM’s memory. As shown in Figure 3 Step 4, the hash
is provided to the guest owner. Due to the fact that the aacker
controls the transport keys, she can provide the hash of the guest
VM’s memory and protect it using the transport keys.
e last step in the guest deployment phase is to provide a secret,
e.g., a disk encryption key, to the guest VM, see Step 5 of Figure 3.
e guest owner protects the disk encryption key using the trans-
port keys. As they are known to the aacker, she can rst decrypt
the disk encryption key and then decrypt the encrypted disk to get
access to the guest virtual machine’s condential data. To fake the
presence of SEV, the aacker injects the encrypted disk encryption
key into the guest virtual machine, i.e., she copies it into the guest’s
memory. e guest is now fully operational; however, although
the remote aestation mechanism of SEV was successfully carried
out, the guest owner has no means to detect the absence of the SEV
feature.
is enables a malicious cloud provider to increase the number
of guests on a single host making use of KSM, see Section 4.2. More
so, as the runtime protection of SEV is not enabled, the aacker
can access any data used in the guest VM.
5.2 Migration Attack
As outlined in Section 4.1, the goal of this aack is to extract run-
time data of an SEV-enabled guest from a host system.
Aack model e aacker is an individual, e.g., a system ad-
ministrator of an otherwise trusted organization, with access to
the management interface of an SEV-enabled host. e victim is a
cloud customer who successfully deployed a virtual machine on the
SEV-enabled host of the cloud provider. We assume that there are
no security issues present in the guest VM and the PSP rmware
on the host. e aacker must have had access to any SEV-enabled
system for one-time extraction of the CEK private key and to obtain
the corresponding CEK certicate. It is not required for the aacker
to have access to the CEK private key belonging to the platform
hosting the VM. Furthermore, he must be able to initiate a virtual
machine migration of the victim’s VM using the management inter-
face of the host. Additionally, the guest policy must allow migration
of the guest. To benet from cloud services such as high availability
and dynamic resource allocation, migration is required in order to
handle resource contention or failures in the host system. us it
is likely that the guest policy allows migration.
Method Similarly to the previous aack, the aacker rst needs
to get hold of a valid CEK private key of any authentic SEV-enabled
system, see Section 3.3. e aacker creates the two certicate
chains as described in Section 5.1, chain 3, and chain 4.
Using the SEV API commands for VM migration (see Section 2.6),
the aacker instructs the SEV rmware to initiate the migration
of the victim’s VM using the prepared PDH, PEK, and ARK. Using
the aacker-controlled PDH, the SEV rmware on the source host
will authenticate the target platform of the migration, see Step 5
of Figure 2. Since the provided certicates were created using a
valid (extracted) CEK, the SEV rmware will accept the PDH. e
SEV rmware then generates the transport keys, and wraps them
using keys derived from the authenticated PDH, see Steps 7 and 8 of
Figure 2. e memory of the VM is encrypted using the generated
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transport keys and exported along with the wrapped transport
keys.
Instead of forwarding the keys, see Step 9 of Figure 2, the at-
tacker can now unwrap the transport keys and decrypt the virtual
machine’s memory since he controls the PDH that was used to
derive the keys used to encrypt the transport keys.
We emphasize that this aack does not require any security
issues to be present in the PSP rmware of the source host. By
owning any CEK private key, the aacker can impersonate a valid
target for migration. As the transport encryption keys in SEV must
be shared with the target of a migration, the aacker, posing as a
valid migration target, can decrypt the exported memory.
5.3 Debug Override Attack
Similarly to the previous aack and as outlined in Section 4.1, the
goal of this aack is to extract run-time data of an SEV-enabled
guest from a host system.
Aack model e aack model is similar to the Migration At-
tack in Section 5.2, with the additional requirement that the at-
tacker must be able to install UEFI updates on the system that hosts
the victim’s VM. UEFI updates can be deployed remotely without
any physical access using the server’s update mechanism, see Sec-
tion 3.2. Alternatively, they can be deployed with physical access
via directly programming the SPI ash located on the server’s moth-
erboard using an SPI programmer.
Method e SEV API species a debug interface to assist debug-
ging of SEV-protected virtual machines. e debug interface allows
a hypervisor to read and write guest memory in plaintext, see [3,
Chapter 7.1]. For example, in a QEMU/KVM scenario, QEMU oers
the pmemsave command to dump guest memory to a le [31]. In
an SEV-enabled guest, that memory is encrypted and thus of no
use to debug the guest. e SEV API debug commands enable the
hypervisor to dump plaintext memory instead. e SEV rmware
will only allow the use of this interface if the guest owner explicitly
enabled debugging in the guest policy as described in Section 2.5.
Using the security issues described in Section 3.2, an aacker is
able to patch the SEV rmware so that it ignores the policy. Aer
installing the patched rmware, the SEV rmware will decrypt or
encrypt guest memory regardless of the guest owner’s policy. is
allows the aacker to read and write arbitrary guest memory using
the SEV debug interface from the SEV-enabled host.
Leveraging these security aws, we were able to successfully
install such a patched version of the SEV rmware. As opposed to
previous aacks on SEV such as [25] and [15], this aack does not
depend on any services running inside the guest VM.
is aack is also possible if the rmware vulnerabilities de-
scribed in Section 3.2 are xed. Due to the missing rollback pre-
vention, an aacker can always replace the existing PSP OS with a
vulnerable version before installing her patched SEV rmware.
6 DISCUSSION
In the previous sections, we laid out how security issues in the PSP
rmware pave the way for aacks against SEV that permanently
break the security properties of the SEV technology on AMD Epyc
based systems. Furthermore, we demonstrated that, although the
issues have been addressed through rmware updates, the con-
dentiality of SEV-protected systems is still at risk. is is due to the
fact that the presence of an updated rmware cannot be veried by
a guest owner. A given CEK is valid throughout the lifetime of the
CPU and does not depend on the rmware version. is section
discusses possible mitigations and proposes a key generation design
for future SEV implementations.
Without vulnerabilities as the one described in Section 3, none of
our aacks would be possible. Various methods such as static and
dynamic analysis, formal verication, and extensive code audits
naturally come to mind when discussing possible mitigations. How-
ever, the sheer amount of security issues that are present in related
systems, such as Intel ME [16, 17] and the PSP itself [13], prove the
diculty to ensure the absence of security issues. We hence believe
that the security design of SEV should incorporate the possibility of
rmware bugs. us the proposed mitigations focus on SEV design
changes that empower a guest owner to enforce the use of both an
authentic as well as an up-to-date rmware on the remote platform.
6.1 Current Design Issues
As discussed in Section 3.2, the PSP allows installing any signed
rmware, including rollbacks to previous insecure versions. is
allows aackers to provision any AMD Epyc CPU with a vulnerable
PSP OS version and mount the aacks discussed earlier. While the
current on-chip bootloader is not updatable, AMD conrmed that it
is possible to revoke an ARK and enforce the use of alternative keys
to verify the integrity of the PSP OS. is mechanism can be used
to label every currently available PSP rmware as untrusted, i.e.,
eectively preventing an aacker to roll back to a vulnerable PSP
OS version. However, it does not allow a guest owner to verify that
a PSP OS version signed with the alternative key is actually used.
Furthermore, the CEK does not depend on the PSP OS version, i.e.,
a CEK extracted before the revocation of the ARK key is still valid
aerwards - its lifetime is the lifetime of the CPU [3, Chapter 2.1.3].
us this approach is insucient to mitigate our proposed aacks.
is is also true for another SEV mechanism: SEV allows the guest
owner to enforce the SEV API version implemented by the remote
platform, see Section 2.5 Step 4. However, the SEV API check is
only enforced by the SEV rmware. An aacker able to manipulate
the SEV rmware can spoof arbitrary SEV API versions.
e validity of the CEK across rmware versions impedes mit-
igations only based on rmware updates. To overcome this, we
propose design changes to the SEV technology which are laid out
in the next section.
6.2 Proposed SEV Design Changes
e goal of our proposed design changes is to enable the guest
owner to enforce the use of an authentic and up-to-date PSP rmware.
It is specically not our goal to provide means to ensure the PSP
rmware has no bugs in the rst place. We rather focus on design
changes that allow ensuring the PSP rmware in use is still trusted.
Our proposed changes aim to incur only low complexity overhead
to the current SEV technology. is enables re-use of the current
soware stack and minimizes the required eort to migrate to our
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proposed design.
CEK Derivation e current CEK is derived using a key deriva-
tion function (KDF) that takes a 32-byte secret value which is
unique per CPU and is stored in one-time-programmable (OTP)
fuses (SOTP ):
CEK = KDF(SOTP )
We propose to change the way the CEK is generated in order to
connect it to the PSP OS version and the SEV rmware version. To
that end, we introduce a two-stage secret generation procedure. In-
stead of deriving the CEK directly from the SOTP , two intermediate
secrets are derived using dierent inputs:
(1) SPSP : based on the PSP OS version (PV ) and SOTP .
SPSP = KDF(PV , SOTP )
(2) SCEK : based on the SEV rmware version (SV ) and SPSP .
SCEK = KDF(SV , SPSP )
e nal CEK is then derived from SCEK :
CEK = KDF(SCEK )
For the sake of simplicity, static, i.e., non-condential, inputs to the
KDF were omied. e resulting CEK will not only depend on the
chip-unique SOTP , but also on the current PSP OS version as well
as the SEV rmware version. As the intermediate secrets must not
be accessible by an aacker, our design separates the derivation of
those secrets in dierent PSP rmware components.
On-Chip
Bootloader
PSP OS
SEV Firmware
On-Chip
Bootloader
SOTP
PSP OS
SEV Firmware
SPSP
SCEK
Current SEV Design Proposed SEV Design
SOTP
 version 
 version 
Figure 5: e current SEV design as opposed to our proposed
design. Dashed lines between two secrets show a derivation.
Boxes show the scope of secrets and rmware components.
In the current SEV design, the initial CEK secret, SOTP , is ac-
cessible to the on-chip bootloader, the PSP OS as well as the SEV
rmware (see le part of Figure 5).
Our new design proposes a beer isolation, as depicted on the
right hand side of Figure 5. e SOTP is only accessible to the
on-chip bootloader and is used in conjunction with the PSP OS
version to derive the SPSP . e SPSP is accessible by the PSP OS
and is given as an input to a key derivation function together with
the SEV rmware version. e derived SCEK is used by the SEV
rmware to nally derive the CEK.
e required changes in the rmware components are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
On-chip Bootloader e current on-chip bootloader provisions
the Cryptographic Co-Processor (CCP) with the SOTP , see Step 1 of
Figure 4. In our proposed design, the on-chip bootloader provisions
the CCP with SPSP instead.
SPSP is derived from the SOTP and the PSP OS version using a
key derivation function. e PSP OS version is a eld in the signed
header of the PSP OS component stored on ash. e current
on-chip bootloader is already required to read this header as it
contains information about the key used to verify its signature.
In addition, the on-chip bootloader needs to implement the key
derivation function that derives the SPSP . It is crucial for our
enhanced design, that the original SOTP is never visible outside
the scope of the on-chip bootloader. To that end, the hardware
component implementing the access to the SOTP must prevent
further accesses aer the rst access.
As the on-chip bootloader is not updatable, it is paramount that
its code complexity is rather low. Any errors in this component that
are identied aer the CPU is manufactured and shipped cannot
be xed.
While our proposed changes do increase the overall complex-
ity of the on-chip bootloader, we believe they are reasonable and
manageable. Determining the PSP OS version incurs only lile
overhead as this information is present in the PSP OS header stored
on ash. Including the PSP OS version in the SPSP simply requires
parsing one additional header eld.
e key derivation function does add additional complexity.
However, the PSP system has access to the CCP, which oers the
possibility to ooad cryptographic operations. We believe that the
complexity of the KDF implementation can be reduced by ooad-
ing the cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions, to the
CCP. In fact, the CCP is already leveraged to verify the signature
of the rmware components. e proposed KDF in the on-chip
bootloader could make use of the CCP in a similar fashion.
Limiting the privilege of accessing the SOTP to only the on-chip
bootloader eectively reduces the risk of leaking the SOTP as Fig-
ure 5 illustrates.
PSP OS In contrast to the original SEV design, the PSP OS must
not get access to the original SOTP . Instead, it only has access to
the intermediate secret SPSP that depends on the PSP OS version.
Similarly to the proposed on-chip bootloader changes, the PSP OS
uses the SEV rmware version together with the SPSP to derive
the SCEK . e SEV rmware version information is present in the
header of the SEV rmware which is parsed by the PSP OS. e
resulting SCEK now depends on the SOTP , the PSP OS version and
the SEV rmware version. As the PSP OS runs at a higher privilege
level (SVC mode) than the SEV rmware (USR mode), the intermedi-
ate SPSP is not accessible by the SEV rmware. Only the SCEK is
provided to the SEV rmware through a syscall.
SEV API To accommodate for our proposed design changes, the
format of the CEK certicate, see [3, Appendix C.1], must be ex-
tended. In the current SEV API, version 17 at the time of writing, the
CEK certicate contains no information about the PSP components.
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We propose to extend the CEK certicate format to also include the
minimum PSP OS and SEV rmware versions. As opposed to the
original SEV design, there are now multiple valid CEKs for a single
CPU.
To enable the guest owner to enforce rmware versions of the
remote platform, we further propose to extend the guest policy to
include the PSP OS version as well as the SEV rmware version.
SEV Firmware e current SEV rmware derives the CEK from
a secret value that is provided by the PSP OS. is does not change
in our proposed design. However, the SOTP is not exposed to the
SEV rmware. Instead, the CEK is derived from the SCEK which is
accessible via a syscall.
As there are now multiple CEKs for a single platform, the SEV
API must support to enforce the minimum SEV rmware version
and PSP OS version that is dened by the guest policy.
During the initial deployment, the guest owner will additionally
receive the rmware versions, Step 1 of Figure 2, and will query
the AMD key server using the platform ID together with the stated
rmware versions, see variant D, Step 3 of Figure 2. e retrieved
CEK is then used in the certicate chain verication, as shown in
Step 5 of Figure 2. e verication will only succeed if the remote
platform hosts the stated rmware versions.
In case of migration, the source SEV rmware enforces the mini-
mum rmware versions when authenticating the target platform,
Step 5 of Figure 2. To that end, the source SEV rmware veries
that the versions specied in the provided CEK certicate of the
target, see variant M, Step 4 of Figure 2, are equal to or greater than
the versions specied in the guest policy.
AMDKey Server In the current SEV design, the AMD Key Server
provides means to retrieve a CPU-specic CEK certicate for a
given platform ID, as shown in variant D, Step 3 of Figure 2. In our
enhanced design, the AMD Key Server is queried with a platform
ID as well as PSP OS and SEV rmware versions.
In a similar fashion to the proposed key derivation introduced
above and based on the CPU-specic SOTP , the AMD Key Server
will calculate the intermediate secret SPSP before delivering the
version-dependent SCEK to the client. It is le to AMD how to
communicate the revocation of certain PSP OS and SEV rmware
versions for use with the SEV technology. One possible option is
to disable the generation of CEK certicates for known vulnerable
PSP OS and SEV rmware versions. We believe that the on-demand
calculation of CEKs increases the required computational eort for
the AMD Key Server to a manageable degree.
6.3 Security Evaluation
is section discusses the advantages of our proposed design. For
the following paragraphs, we assume that a previously released
PSP rmware version contained security issues which are xed
in a later version. is is the case for the current state of the PSP
rmware [24]. Furthermore, we assume that AMD publishes in-
formation about the outdated, vulnerable rmware versions along
with the updated version. Additionally, we assume that it is not
possible to extract the CEK from the current PSP rmware version.
Guest Deployment e proposed SEV design changes allow a
guest owner to enforce the use of specic rmware versions on the
remote platform. As the CEK is now tied to the rmware version
deployed on the remote platform, a CEK extracted using dierent
rmware versions is no longer valid. In the current SEV design, the
security of the SEV technology itself is compromised as long as a
bug exists in any relevant PSP rmware component.
During the deployment of a guest VM, the guest owner authen-
ticates the remote platform, see Step 5 in Figure 2. In our enhanced
design, the guest owner retrieves the CEK certicate for the up-to-
date rmware, i.e., the rmware version that includes the bug xes.
To that end, she uses the platform ID of the target platform along
with the required PSP OS and SEV rmware version to retrieve the
CEK certicate from the AMD key server, variant D, Step 3 and 4
of Figure 2.
While a malicious cloud provider could provide an extracted CEK
from an outdated, vulnerable rmware, the CEK will not match
the CEK certicate served by the AMD Key Server. As the guest
owner only trusts CEKs for specic PSP rmware versions, she
will dismiss the proposed CEK from the malicious cloud provider.
is prevents the deployment of SEV-protected guest VMs on SEV
platforms with known security issues.
Since the Fake SEV aack presented in Section 5.1 relies on a
valid, extracted CEK, which can only come from a vulnerable and
therefore revoked rmware, the new design eectively prevents
this aack.
In a similar fashion, the Debug Override aack presented in Sec-
tion 5.3 relies on the ability to alter the SEV rmware in order to
patch and abuse its debug functionality. is is only possible with
a vulnerable, i.e., revoked, rmware, which will be dismissed by
the client.
Migration Leveraging the enhanced SEV design, the guest owner
successfully deployed her virtual machine on a trusted SEV platform.
To ensure the virtual machine is not migrated to a platform using
a vulnerable rmware version, the source SEV rmware enforces
a version check on the CEK. e aack discussed in Section 5.2
requires the aacker to provide an extracted CEK. In the original
SEV design, the source SEV rmware validates the CEK solely on the
fact whether it has a root of trust originating in an ARK certicate.
In our enhanced design, the SEV rmware also ensures that the
CEK certicate is valid for the SEV rmware version specied in the
guest policy. To that end, the CEK certicate contains the PSP OS
version as well as the SEV rmware version numbers, see Section
6.2. e SEV rmware can now verify that the version elds of
the provided CEK are equal to, or higher than the version numbers
specied in the guest policy.
While an aacker could still provide a valid, extracted CEK, she
cannot provide a CEK with a valid version eld assuming the spec-
ied PSP rmware versions do not contain known security issues.
Migration of an SEV-protected virtual machine to an SEV rmware
version lower than specied in the guest policy will not be permit-
ted. is protects against the Migration Aack presented in Section
5.2.
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7 RELATEDWORK
Work such as [18, 23, 29, 33, 34, 36] show that protecting virtual ma-
chines from an untrusted hypervisor has been subject to extensive
research.
In [36] Zhang et al. propose the use of a higher-privileged secu-
rity monitor called CloudVisor in order to protect virtual machines
in the face of a compromised hypervisor. In their aack model, they
assume the cloud provider himself not to be malicious and therefore
exclude physical aacks. In their design, that is very similar to the
design of AMD SEV, they aim to separate resource management
from security protection in the virtualization layer. eir proto-
type version of CloudVisor is implemented in only 5.5K lines of
code and works with the Xen hypervisor. Zhang et al. leverage a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in two ways: e integrity of the
CloudVisor code is ensured by the TPM and Intel Trusted Execution
Technology (TXT). e second use of a TPM in CloudVisor is to
provide condential communication between the cloud customer
and CloudVisor. It roots in the Storage Root Key (SRK) of the TPM,
that has the lifetime of the platform owner and is authenticated by
the Endorsement Key (EK) of the TPM. e EK keypair of TPMs
is unique per chip, thus binding the TPM’s identity. Its private
key must therefore never leave the TPM. e manufacturer of the
TPM provides certicates of the EK public key through a certi-
cate authority (CA). Given that the specic identities of TPMs used
for CloudVisor are guaranteed by a third party, this enables the
cloud customer to also authenticate intermediate keys signed by
the EK. ese can then be used for condential communication.
With AMD SEV, the CEK serves a similar purpose as the EK of a
TPM: It binds the identity of an SEV-capable CPU using chip-unique
one-time-programmable fuses.
While the remote aestation mechanism of SEV has previously
not been subject to research, researchers presented several aacks
against the runtime protection of SEV.
In 2017 Hetzelt and Buhren presented the rst security analysis
of the SEV Technology [15]. ey proposed three aacks on an
SEV-enabled system, two of which rely on the lack of protection of
the Virtual Machine Control Block (VMCB) and registers. ese are
mitigated in case the encrypted state extension to SEV is enabled,
see Section 2.2. e third aack leverages the missing integrity
protection of the guest memory, allowing the hypervisor to conduct
a replay aack. To that end, the nested pagetable was altered to
enforce a pagefault on every guest page that was executed. It was
shown that the sequence of pagefaults is enough to determine
the location of a password in the target VM’s memory. e page
containing the password was then replayed during an aacker
initiated SSH login. Using this primitive, the authors were able to
gain root access to a target system protected by SEV.
Morbitzer et al. leveraged the hypervisor’s control over the
guest resources, namely the nested pagetables, to mount an aack
against an SEV-protected VM [25]. In a similar fashion as [15] they
used page tracking to identify a guest page which is served via
a server running in the VM. As the memory is encrypted with a
guest-specic key, the server will copy the data to an unencrypted
page, e.g., the buer of a virtual network card. Once this page is
located, they manipulate the nested pagetable to change the map-
ping between guest physical pages to host physical pages. e new
mapping will point to condential data of the VM. Instead of copy-
ing the intended data, the server will instead copy the condential
data into the unencrypted buer. is buer is then readable by the
aacker. Using this method, the authors were able to fully decrypt
a VM with 2GB of memory.
In 2018, Israeli research rm CTS Labs published a whitepaper
called AMDFlaws claiming to have found multiple critical vulnera-
bilities in AMD processors allowing arbitrary code execution on
the PSP [21]. In the whitepaper, the researchers publish conceptual
information about vulnerabilities in both Epyc and Ryzen PSPs
as well as alleged manufacturer backdoors in both rmware and
hardware of AMD chipsets supporting Ryzen CPUs. In 2019, two
members of CTS Labs presented insights into three vulnerabili-
ties of the AMDFlaws publication [13]. In the presentation, the
researchers illuminate details about the rmware of the PSP and
the cryptographic checks in use. Nonetheless, the researchers did
not discuss the consequences of a compromised PSP to the SEV
technology.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the rmware components that imple-
ment the SEV API. We identied security issues in the secure boot
mechanism of the PSP that hosts the SEV rmware. is allowed
us to provide a patched version of the SEV rmware which gives
us arbitrary read and write access to the PSP’s memory. We used
this rmware to extract the Chip Endorsement Key (CEK) of three
dierent AMD Epyc processors. We proposed two aacks against
SEV-protected virtual machines using the extracted CEK as well
as an aack based on a patched SEV rmware. While the patched
rmware allowed us to extract encrypted memory in plaintext, the
extracted CEK allows an aacker to impersonate the presence of
SEV altogether. Even if the targeted virtual machine is not executed
on a compromised SEV platform, the migration aack allows an
aacker to acquire the cryptographic keys that are used to encrypt
the virtual machines during migration.
e severity of the proposed aacks is amplied due to the miss-
ing rollback prevention as well as the innite lifetime of the CEK.
We showed that an aacker can always roll back to a vulnerable
PSP rmware to extract the CEK. Even if the PSP rmware is up-
graded to a newer version, this extracted CEK is still valid for the
corresponding CPU.
In the current design of the SEV technology, it is impossible for a
cloud customer to verify the integrity of the remote platform given
the fact that a vulnerable rmware version exists. We conclude that
the SEV technology on AMD Epyc systems of the Naples CPU series
cannot protect virtual machines as the correct deployment cannot
be guaranteed. Given the lifetime of the CEK, it is not possible to
provide purely soware-based mitigations.
To overcome the issues of the current SEV technology, we pro-
posed design changes to SEV that enable the cloud customer to
enforce the use of a specic PSP rmware on the remote platform.
is ensures the trustworthiness of the SEV technology despite PSP
rmware issues as it allows to issue soware-based xes for the
PSP rmware.
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